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THE EMERGING ROLE OF THE QUID PRO QUO
REQUIREMENT IN PUBLIC CORRUPTION
PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE HOBBS ACT
Peter D. Hardy*
This Note discusses the quid pro quo requirement under the
Hobbs Act, a federal criminal statute which applies to bribery by
public officials. The author first describes two recent decisions by
the Supreme Court, McCormick v. United States and Evans v.
United States, which established slightly different version~ of a
quid pro quo requirement in public corruption prosecutions under
the Hobbs Act. The author then explains that the lower federal
courts interpreting McCormick and Evans have molded the quid
pro quo requirement so that a prosecutor must prove in all public
corruption cases under the Hobbs Act that the official intended a
bribe-payor to believe that a momentary payment was a condition
to the performance or nonperformance of particular official acts.
The author further explains that federal courts do not require the
official to either express his intent explicitly or actually intend to
perform an official act. Although the author argues that explicitness by the official should not be required, he also argues that
officials in fact tend to engage in explicit bribery. The author
concludes that judges will continue to mold the quid pro quo
requirement partly according to their individual morai and political perspectives.

The Hobbs Act, 1 a federal criminal statute that prohibits
the obstruction of commerce through robbery or extortion, 2
defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threat-

*
Executive Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 27, 1994. B.A. 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. 1994, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of July 3, 1946, ch. 537,
§ l(c), 60 Stat. 420).
2.
The Hobbs Act states in relevant part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
§ 1951(a).
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ened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."3
The last clause of that definition, referring to obtaining property "under color of official right," has evolved4 into a potent
weapon for federal prosecutors battling public corruption and
bribery at the federal, state, and local levels. 5
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Local 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6 Congress passed the Hobbs Act in 1946, thereby amending the
3.
§ 1951(b)(2).
4.
Federal prosecutors did not apply the Hobbs Act successfully to bribery
cases until 26 years after its passage. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION OF PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES 421 (1988)
[hereinafter PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES] (noting that "[t]he Hobbs Act is as useful
as it is today because innovative prosecutors and investigators brought sound cases
based upon compelling facts when propounding a new theory of prosecution").
5.
See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 905 (1988)
(calling the Hobbs Act "a current darling of the federal prosecutor's nursery");
Charles C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1172 (1977) (arguing that the
Hobbs Act was the "principal vehicle" behind the 500% increase in federal prosecutions of state and local officials from 1970 to 1976); Hon. Herbert J. Stem, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 1 (1971) (asserting
that the Hobbs Act should allow for federal prosecution of public corruption whenever state prosecutors are either unwilling or unable to do so); Charles N. Whitaker,
Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery: Inappropriate Tools and the
Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1630 (1992) (asserting that
the Hobbs Act's primary advantage is a broad grant of jurisdiction over activity
affecting commerce "in any way").
Lee J. Radek, current Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, has stated:
Despite the fact that the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952), RICO (18 U.S.C.
§ 1962), and 18 U.S.C. § 666 provide for more direct Federal jurisdiction over
bribery of state and local officials, the most popular statutory tool used by
Federal law enforcement for combating state and local corruption continues to
be the prohibition against extortion contained in the Hobbs Act. The reasons
for this popularity are basic: ease of proof and severity of penalty.
PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at 415.
Mr. Radek also notes:
[The Hobbs Act is] an extremely powerful tool . . . in combating state and
local corruption, for it punishes activity with a 20-year maximum sentence
which, if engaged in by Federal officials and prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 201
[the federal bribery statute], would be punishable by fifteen years for bribery
or two years for gratuity.

Id. at 419-20. For a discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 201, see infra notes 120-33 and
accompanying text.
6.
315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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Anti-Racketeering Act of 19347 so that it would apply explicitly
to labor racketeering. 8 Until the early 1970s, all Hobbs Act
extortion convictions rested upon a showing that a person
receiving property had obtained that property through the
actual or threatened use of"force, violence, or fear." 9 In 1972,
however, beginning with United States v. Kenny, 10 federal
courts embraced the argument that public officials could
violate the Hobbs Act without having employed force, violence,
or fear. 11 This interpretation of the Hobbs Act, which obviated
the need to demonstrate coercion on the part of a public
official, paved the way for the Hobbs Act to blossom into an
especially effective antibribery statute. 12 Some judges and commentators have criticized vehemently the application of the
Hobbs Act to bribery by officials, castigating such an approach
as an invitation for an especially insidious form of prosecutorial bias 13 and an unjustifiably broad interpretation of the
statute. 14 Recently, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged

7.
Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934).
8.
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 261-63 (1992).
9.
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 n.5 (1991).
10. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kropke v. United States, 409
U.S. 914 (1972).
11. Eric D. Weissman, Note, McCormick v. United States: The Quid Pro Quo
Requirement in Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 42 CATH. U. L.
REV. 433, 436 & n.12 (1993) (citing cases in which each individual circuit accepted
the argument that a public official need not use duress or coercio~ to violate the
Hobbs Act).
12. See supra note 5; see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 586 (1981) ("[After
Kenny,) bribery was to be called extortion. The federal policing of state corruption
had begun."); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1977, at 36 (discussing 337 federal
indictments of state and local officials involved in corruption in 1976). .
13. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (E.D. La. 1979)
("(W]hether one is prosecuted and convicted or not may ultimately depend not upon
one's conduct, but upon one's popularity, political affiliation, influence, and even
personality. Potential abuse and erratic verdicts are inherent in the ambiguities of
[the Hobbs Act]."), rev'd, 621 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1980), and cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); cf Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political
Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 337, 343 (1983) (arguing that the unrestrained
exercise of discretion by an insulated branch oflaw enforcement under the Hobbs Act
hinders state autonomy and also that decisions to prosecute can be arbitrary); Ruff,
supra note 5, at 1211 (discussing the breadth of prosecutorial discretion under the
Hobbs Act).
14. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 278-87 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Hobbs Act only prohibits officials from taking property under
the false pretense that they have an official right to the payment). But see Adam H.
Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecution of State and Local
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 369, 376-77 (1989) (arguing that the need for citizens to
have faith in government at all levels justifies federal prosecution of local and state
corruption); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 817-18, 905-09 (arguing that because neither
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that the Hobbs Act does apply to the acceptance of bribes by
public officials. 15 Holding that a public official need not "induce" a payment to·commit extortion under the Hobbs Act, the
Court stated:
At common law, extortion was an offense committed by
a public official who took "by colour of his office" money
that was not due to him for the performance of his official
duties. A demand, or request, by the public official was not
an element of the offense. Extortion by the public official
was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe
as "taking a bribe." It is clear that petitioner committed
that offense. The question is whether the [Hobbs Act],
insofar as it applies to official extortion, has narrowed the
common-law definition. 16
The Court answered this question in the negative. 17
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
Hobbs Act prevents the acceptance of bribes by public officials,
what constitutes a bribe still remains unclear. Courts traditionally have tried to prevent the Hobbs Act from subjecting
public officials to liability simply for accepting money or other
things of value. Three closely related concerns lie behind such
efforts: given the practical realities of the political process, an
overly broad Hobbs Act might (1) criminalize valuable political
activity, (2) criminalize activity which may be of questionable
value but in which all politicians inevitably and constantly
common law extortion nor the New York statute upon which the Hobbs Act was
modelled contemplated that extortion and bribery are mutually exclusive crimes, the
Hobbs Act applies to bribery as well as to coercive extortion). See generally Dan K.
Webb et al., Limiting Public Corruption Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act: Will
United States v. Evans Be the Next McNalley?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 40-45 (1991)
(arguing that the Hobbs Act does not prohibit the passive receipt of bribes); James
P. Fleissner, Note, Prosecuting Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as
an Element of Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066,
1086-87 (1985) (arguing that the Hobbs Act should require "inducement" by the
official, lest it unfairly apply to the acceptance of gratuities); Joseph M. Harary, Note,
Misapplication of the Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1348-51 (1985)
(stating that the existence of alternative statutes suggests that Congress did not
intend for the Hobbs Act to apply to bribery); David R. Purvis, Note, Limiting
Expansion into Public Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: United States v. O'Grady, 18
CONN. L. REV. 183, 202 (1985) (asserting that officials prosecuted under the Hobbs
Act for extortion should be able to defend on the basis that they committed only
bribery).
15.
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
16. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 263-69.
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engage, and (3) impose stiff penalties for conduct not clearly
meriting such severe punishment. 18
In 1991, prior to Evans v. United States 19 but with these
concerns apparently in mind, the Supreme Court announced
in McCormick v. United States 20 that, under the Hobbs Act,
the government must prove the existence of a quid pro quo to
convict an official for extortion under color of official right
based on the receipt of a campaign contribution. 21 The Court
indicated that campaign contributions could be vulnerable
under the Hobbs Act "if the payments [were] made in return
for an explicit promise or undertaking bl the official to perform or not to perform an official act." 2 Unfortunately, the
Court did not elaborate further on the quid pro quo requirement, 23 and subsequent opinions, both by lower courts and by
the Supreme Court, indicate that the quid pro quo requirement is subject to several different interpretations.
This Note considers how courts have handled the quid pro
quo requirement in Hobbs Act public corruption prosecutions
since McCormick. Part I analyzes how the Supreme Court has
treated the requirement. Part II examines how the lower
courts have struggled with the requirement. Finally, Part III
suggests what role the quid pro quo requirement should have
in future cases.
This Note ultimately attempts to answer four basic questions: (1) whether the payment must be given for particular
and identifiable official acts; (2) whether the quid pro quo
must be stated explicitly, or whether it may be implied; (3)
whether the quid pro quo requirement envisions an actual
agreement that the public official intends· to carry out; and (4)
whether the quid pro quo requirement is limited to campaign
contributions. 24 This Note argues that all prosecutions for
18. See infra notes 57, 117-19 and accompanying text.
19. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
20.
500 U.S. 257 (1991).
21. Id. at 274; see also PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at 299 (defining
a quid pro quo as "one thing given in exchange for anothern).
22. Id. at 273.
23. Id.
24.
For the purposes of this Note, a "campaign contributionn case is an official
extortion case in which the trial judge rules that sufficient evidence allows the
defendant to make the claim that the payments at issue were campaign contributions. A "non-campaign contribution• case is a case in which the defendant either
does not claim that payments were contributions or insufficient evidence supports his
claim.
This Note adopts a functional definition of a "campaign contribution•: a payment
is a campaign contribution when the donor intends it to be spent on the donee's
political campaign, and the donee spends it in that manner. Whether a payment
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extortion under color of official right, including non-campaign
contribution cases, should require the government to prove
that the official intended the payor to believe that receipt of a
monetary payment was a condition to the performance or
nonperformance of specific official acts. No actual agreement
should be required, however, and the official should not have
to express his intent explicitly. 25
Despite struggling to identify the limits of a quid pro quo,
this Note nonetheless concludes that a careful legal definition
can have little practical effect on whether or not any given
defendant is convicted. Although courts purport to safeguard
strictly political activity from Hobbs Act liability, a review of
the case law indicates that public officials consistently provide
ample evidence for their own convictions by conducting their
illicit deals openly and explicitly. Success for defendants on
appeal almost always is based upon some error in the jury
instructions rather than insufficient evidence. Prosecutors
therefore should not jeopardize likely convictions by demanding favorable jury instructions containing a risky legal theory.
This Note also concludes that judges will mold the evolving
quid pro requirement according to their own moral and political viewpoints. Judges uncomfortable with the correlation
between wealth and political influence will tend to weaken the
quid pro quo requirement, whereas judges untroubled by such
a correlation will tend to enforce the quid pro quo requirement
strictly.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO THE QUID PRO
Quo REQUIREMENT: McCORMICK AND EvANS

The Supreme Court recently rendered two opm1ons concerning the quid pro quo requirement in Hobbs Act public

complies with applicable campaign-financing laws and is recorded properly is nondispositive evidence of whether it is in fact a campaign contribution.
25. A semantic problem that will continue to plague this Note and the cases
examined is that the words "explicit" and "specific" can be, and sometimes are, used
interchangeably. This Note uses the word "explicit" to refer only to an agreement
whose existence has been acknowledged clearly in words by the parties. This Note
uses the word "specific" to refer to an agreement which concerns particular, identifiable official acts. A non-explicit agreement therefore can be "specific" when parties
operate with the knowledge that the agreement entails a particular payment for a
particular act, even if no one has expressly stated so. Conversely, a non-specific
agreement can be "explicit" when a party has acknowledged in express words that the
payments are for a general benefit, such as the official's increased "goodwill.•
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corruption prosecutions. The first opinion, McCormick v. United States, 26 established the necessity of an explicit quid pro
quo in campaign contribution cases. 27 The second opinion,
Evans v. United States, 28 discussed the quid pro quo requirement somewhat cryptically, leaving considerable uncertainty
as to whether the quid pro quo requirement announced only
one year earlier in McCormick was being expanded, relaxed,
or both.

A. McCormick v. United States
Robert L. McCormick was a state representative in West
Virginia who routinely supported a state program allowing
foreign medical school graduates to practice under temporary
permits while studying for the state licensing exams, even if
the graduates repeatedly had failed such exams. 29 When the
state legislature threatened to terminate this program in the
1980s, several of the temporarily licensed doctors organized
and hired a lobbyist, John Vandergrift, to represent them in
the state capital. 30 In 1984, after McCormick sponsored successful legislation to extend the program for another year, he
and Vandergrift agreed that McCormick would sponsor legislation granting the doctors permanent medical licenses based
on their years of experience. 31
During his 1984 reelection bid, McCormick told Vandergrift
that his campaign was expensive and that he had not heard
from the doctors. 32 Vandergrift contacted the doctors and
eventually delivered nine one-hundred dollar bills from the
doctors to McCormick. 33 That same day, Vandergrift delivered
an additional two thousand dollars in cash. 34 Later in 1984,
McCormick received three more cash payments directly from
members of the doctors' organization. 35 McCormick failed to

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Id. at 273.
504 U.S. 255 (1992).
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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report these payments as campaign contributions or to list
them as income on his federal tax return. 36 Similarly, ~he
doctors' organization did not list these expenditures as campaign contributions. 37
In 1985, McCormick sponsored the legislation that he and
Vandergrift had discussed the previous year, speaking at
length in favor of the bill during floor debate. 38 Two weeks
after the bill had been passed and signed into law, McCormick
received a final cash payment from the doctors. 39
The government eventually prosecuted McCormick on five
counts of violating the Hobbs Act and one count of filing a
false income tax return. 40 The trial judge gave extensive jury
instructions regarding the Hobbs Act claims, especially regarding the sort of relationship McCormick needed to have maintained with the doctors' organization to have violated the
Hobbs Act. 41 On the second day of deliberations, the jury

36. Id. State law limited cash campaign contributions to $50 per person. Id.
(citing W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5d (1990)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 261.
41.
The jury instructions, as quoted by the Supreme Court, stated:
"In proving [that Mr. McCormick induced the doctors to part with property
under color of official right], it is enough that the government prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the benefactor transferred something of significant value,
here alleged to be money, to the public official with the expectation that the
public official would extend to him some benefit or refrain from some harmful
action, and the public official accepted the money knowing it was being transferred to him with that expectation by the benefactor and because of his office.

"It would not be illegal, in and of itself, for the defendant to solicit or accept
political contributions from foreign doctors who would benefit from this legislation.
"In order to find Mr. McCormick guilty of extortion, you must first be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a given count
in the indictment was made by or on behalf of the doctors with the expectation
that such payment would influence Mr. McCormick's official conduct, and with
the knowledge on the part of Mr. McCormick that they were paid to him with
that expectation by virtue of the office he held.
"It is not illegal, in and of itself, for an elected legislator to solicit or accept
legitimate campaign contributions, on behalf of himself or other legislators, from
individuals who have a special interest in pending legislation. The solicitation
or receipt of such contributions violates the federal extortion law only when the
payment is wrongfully induced under color of official right.
"Many public officials receive legitimate political contributions from individuals who, the official knows, are motivated by a general gratitude toward him
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requested that the trial judge read the instructions again,
"'with particular emphasis on the definition of extortion under
the color of official right and on the law as regards the portion
of moneys received that does not have to be reported as income.' "42 The trial judge restated most of the instructions, but
he also made what the Supreme Court eventually would describe as a "significant addition" 43 by stating the following:
"Extortion under color of official right means the obtaining of money by a public official when the money
obtained was not lawfully due and owing to him or to his
office. Of course, extortion does not occur where one who
is a public official receives a legitimate gift or a voluntary
political contribution even though the political contribution
may have been made in cash in violation of local law.
Voluntary is that which is freely given without expectation
of benefit."44
The jury convicted McCormick on the tax evasion count and
the first Hobbs Act count. 45
McCormick appealed, arguing that his conviction under the
Hobbs Act was not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, McCormick claimed that "the payments were campaign
contributions and not illegal payoffs because there was no
coercion or quid pro quo exchange for the payments."46 The
Fourth Circuit, stating that the crucial question was whether

because of his position on certain issues important to them, or even in the hope
that the good will generated by such contributions will make the official more
receptive to their cause.
"The mere solicitation or receipt of such political contributions is not illegal.

"So it is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant
committed or promised to commit a quid pro quo, that is, consideration in the
nature of official action in return for the payment of the money not lawfully
owed. Such a quid pro quo may, of course, be forthcoming in an extortion case
or it may not. In either event it is not an essential element of the crime."

Id. at 262-64 n.4.
42. Id. at 262-63.
43. Id. at 264.
44. Id. at 264-65.
45. Id. at 265.
46. United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 500 U.S.
257 (1991).
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McCormick had extorted money or merely accepted an illegal
campaign contribution, ruled that sufficient evidence supported McCormick's conviction. 47
The Fourth Circuit first noted a Second Circuit ruling that
an official could violate the Hobbs Act without participating in
a quid pro quo exchange, i.e., a "specifically identifiable misuse of office by the official on behalf of the payor in return for
the payment of money." 48 The court then declared that when
neither the official nor the payor treats a payment as a legitimate contribution, a jury reasonably may infer that the payment was induced by the official's office in violation of the
Hobbs Act. 49 The court indicated that such a rule seeks to
prevent officials from escaping criminal liability simply by
designating illicit payments as "campaign contributions" and
avoiding explicit agreements. 50 The court listed seven factors
to consider when determining whether payments were "legitimate" contributions, 51 but it stressed that violating election
laws alone does not violate the Hobbs Act. 52 The opinion
suggests that an illegal agreement need not be either explicit
or specific. 53

47.
Id. at 65. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit found that both the violations of
state campaign financing laws and McCormick's statement to Vandergrift that he had
not "heard from" the doctors, made with the knowledge that the doctors needed his
continued support to obtain permanent licenses, allowed a jury to find that McCormick
extorted money from the doctors for his support of the licensing legislation and to find
that neither McCormick nor the doctors intended the payments to be campaign
contributions. Id. at 67. Whether the Fourth Circuit considered these two possible jury
findings to be separate or identical is unclear.
48.
Id. at 66.
49.
Id.
50. Id.
51.
The Fourth Circuit's non-exhaustive list of factors included the following:
(l) whether the money was recorded by the payor as a campaign contribution,

(2) whether the money was recorded and reported by the official as a campaign
contribution, (3) whether the payment was in cash, (4) whether it was delivered
to the official personally or to his campaign, (5) whether the official acted in his
official capacity at or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor
or supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the official
had supported similar legislation before the time of the payment, and (7)
whether the official had directly or indirectly solicited the payor individually for
the payment.

Id.
52. Id.
53.
Whether the Fourth Circuit rejected a specificity requirement is admittedly
unclear. Nonetheless, the fact that the court (1) stated that the Hobbs Act merely
requires use of official power; (2) approved prior cases holding that no specifically
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The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in an
opinion by Justice White. 54 The Court acknowledged that the
court of appeals was correct to note the importance, under the
Hobbs Act, of whether payments to officials are in fact campaign contributions and that the intent of the parties is relevant to such a classification. 55 The Court nonetheless ruled
that proving a quid pro quo is necessary to convict an official
for accepting a campaign contribution. 56
The Court based its holding on a concern for the realities of
interest-group politics, noting that it was limiting the reach of
the Hobbs Act because the financing of any campaign necessarily involves officials taking contributions from payors expecting some sort of benefit:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will
benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is
the everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that
campaigns must be run and financed. Money is constantly
being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views
and what they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical
considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that
legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they
act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation
furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited
and received from those beneficiaries ... would open to
prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to
be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real
sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are
financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they
have been from the beginning of the Nation. It would
require statutory language more explicit than the Hobbs
Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion. 57

identifiable official act need be at issue; and (3) emphasized that the parties simply
intended a payment not to be a legitimate campaign contribution, strongly suggests
that the court did not require specificity. See id. at 63-67.
For an explanation of the distinction that this Note draws between agreements
which are "explicitn and those which are "specific,n see supra note 25.
54.
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id.
274.
57. Id. at 272-73. Professor Lindgren has characterized the McCormick Court's
reasoning as "neither textual nor historicaln but rather "pragmatic and logical. n

at
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The Court then attempted to define the contours of the quid
pro quo requirement, stating that an official violates the
Hobbs Act by accepting campaign contributions "if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official
act. In such situations the official asserts that his official
conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or
undertaking. "58 The Court further rejected the Fourth Circuit's
seven-factor test, stating that the first four factors "could not
possibly by themselves amount to extortion'' 59 and that the
Hobbs Act still might not be violated even if every factor
indicated that a payment was not a legitimate campaign
contribution. 60 The Court, however, noted that it was not
addressing whether sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo
existed in the instant case, 61 nor whether a quid pro quo requirement also existed in non-campaign contribution cases. 62
Finally, the Court rejected the prosecution's argument that
the jury instructions at trial captured the quid pro quo requirement.
[U]nder the instructions a contribution was not "voluntary"
if given with any expectation of benefit; and as we read the
instructions, taken as a whole, the jury was told that it
could find McCormick guilty of extortion if any of the
payments, even though a campaign contribution, was made
by the doctors with the expectation that McCormick's

James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery·Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1709 (1993).
58. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273. The Court also looked to the language of
another case to assist with its definition of the quid pro quo requirement:
"A moment's reflection should enable one to distinguish, at least in the abstract,
a legitimate solicitation from the exaction of a fee for a benefit conferred or an
injury withheld. Whether described familiarly as a payoff or with the Latinate
precision of quid pro quo, the prohibited exchange is the same: a public official
may not demand payment as inducement for the promise to perform (or not to
perform) an official act.•

Id. (quoting United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 943 (1982)). The Dozier court, however, never held that the quid pro quo
requirement must be explicit. See Dozier, 672 F.2d at 53~9.
59. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272. The Court described the last three factors as
"more telling.• Id. For the complete list of factors, see supra note 51.
60. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.
61. Id. at 267 n.5.
62. Id. at 274 & n.10.
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official action would be influenced for their benefit and if
McCormick knew that the payment was made with that
expectation. 63
The jury, therefore, "might well have found that the payments
were campaign contributions but not voluntary because they
were given with an expectation ofbenefit."64 The jury instructions were unacceptable because they allowed the jury to
convict upon a finding that the payors had only a nonspecific
expectation of a general benefit. 65
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor,
dissented. The dissent first argued that sufficient evidence
supported McCormick's conviction. 66 Justice Stevens then
criticized the majority for requiring that the agreement between the payor and the official be explicit, noting the absence
of a statutory or policy basis for the requirement. 67 Justice
Stevens agreed, however, that the Hobbs Act requires a mutual understanding that a payment is for a specific official act:
Nevertheless, to prove a violation of the Hobbs Act, I
agree with the Court that it is essential that the payment

63. Id. at 274.
64. Id. at 275.
65. Id. at 274-75. The Supreme Court's holding constituted a departure from the
established law of some federal circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688
F.2d 108, 133 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that an official extortion conviction need only
rest upon the fact that an official accepted payments knowing that they were
"motivated as a result of his exercise of the powers of his public office"), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir.) (holding
that the motivation of the payor need only focus on the recipient's office), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 927 (1980).
66. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[McCormick's) covert
acceptance of the cash-indeed, his denial at trial that he received any such
payment-supports the conclusion that [McCormick) understood the payers' intention
and that he had implicitly (at least) promised to provide them with the benefit that
they sought.").
67. Justice Stevens stated that "there is no statutory requirement that illegal
agreements, threats, or promises be in writing, or in any particular form. Subtle
extortion is just as wrongful-and probably much more common-than the kind of
express understanding that the Court's opinion seems to require." Id. Justice Stevens
_also argued:
[W)rongful use of political power by a public official ... [is] comparable to a
known thug's offer to protect a storekeeper against the risk of severe property
damage in exchange for a cash consideration. Neither the legislator nor the
thug needs to make an explicit threat or an explicit promise to get his message
across.

Id.
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in question be contingent on a mutual understanding that
the motivation for the payment is the payer's desire to
avoid a specific threatened harm or to obtain a promised
benefit that the defendant has the apparent power to
deliver, either through the use of force or the use of public
office. In this sense, the crime does require a "quid pro
quo."as
The dissent characterized the majority's holding as follows: to
convict a public official under the Hobbs Act for accepting
payments claimed to be campaign contributions, 69 the government must prove the existence of an explicit agreement regarding a specific official act. 70

B. Evans v. United States
One year after deciding McCormick, the Supreme Court
again considered the reach of the Hobbs Act in Evans v.

68. Id. at 283. Justice Stevens elaborated on his position, asserting that
McCormick completed his crime as soon as he accepted money from the doctors with
the understanding that he would exercise his official powers on their behalf. "What
!McCormick) did thereafter might have evidentiary significance, but could neither
undo a completed crime nor complete an uncommitted offense. n Id. Justice Stevens
also argued that the jury instructions properly focused on the parties' intent and
sufficiently advised the jury that McCormick's acceptance of payments was not
criminal unless he accepted money pursuant to a mutual understanding that his
support of the licensing legislation was contingent upon the tendering of such
payments. Id. at 283-84.
69. Based on the facts and the ultimate holding, the McCormick Court apparently would require that.the jury be given a quid pro quo instruction whenever a
defendant simply asserts that payments were in fact campaign contributions. See id.
at 274. Other than the fact that McCormick made his first demand for payment by
communicating to Vandergrift that he had an election coming up and that he had not
heard from the doctors, the opinion contains no facts indicating that the payments
actually were campaign contributions; rather, the payments were in cash, went
unrecorded by all parties, and violated state election laws. Id. at 260 & n.l. Further,
McCormick apparently never introduced any evidence that the money actually went
towards particular campaign debts.
The fact that a payment is a campaign contribution does not mean necessarily that
the official is immune from Hobbs Act liability. A payment which is properly
recorded, complies with applicable campaign financing laws, and is used to fund the
official's campaign violates the Hobbs Act if it was made in exchange for the performance of a specific official act. Id. at 273. Conversely, a completely personal payment
to an official does not violate the Hobbs Act unless the requisite intent is present.
70. Id. at 283. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, likewise implied that the
Court was requiring "an explicit promise of favorable future action" by an official in
Hobbs Act prosecutions involving the acceptance of campaign contributions. Id. at
276.
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United States. 11 The Court declined to limit the Act further
and concluded that an official need not have "induced" payments to commit extortion under color of official right. 72 The
Evans opinion suggests that the quid pro quo requirement is
not as rigorous as a literal reading of McCormick might
indicate.
In March 1985, Clifford Cormany, Jr., a special agent for the
Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI), was introduced to John
Evans, a member of the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb
County, Georgia. 73 Cormany, posing as a land developer representing a group of investors seeking a rezoning of certain
property, had a series of meetings and telephone conversations
with Evans over the next nineteen months. 74 These discussions
often concerned Evans' ability to assist Cormany and the
group he represented in rezoning the property, as well as
Cormany's ability to help defray Evans' campaign expenses. 75
Cormany's initial application for rezoning was rejected because
local regulation required a two year period between rezonings,
and Cormany's land had been rezoned less than two years
earlier. Cormany and Evans then discussed the possibility of
getting this two-year requirement waived. During this discussion, Cormany gave Evans a check for $1000, which was
marked as a campaign contribution and later reported as
such. 76 Cormany also gave Evans an additional $7000 in cash,
which Evans did not report until learning that he was under
investigation and which he failed to mention to FBI agents
who questioned him about Cormany's campaign contributions. 77 The Board of Commissioners did waive the two-year
requirement, although Cormany ultimately withdrew the
zoning application without prejudice. 78
The government prosecuted Evans on one count of Hobbs
Act official extortion and one count of failure to report income
on his federal tax return. 79 The trial judge instructed the jury
on the Hobbs Act official extortion count, stating that although

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
money
77.
78.
79.

504 U.S. 255 (1992).
Id. at 265-66.
United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 792 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 792-94.
Id. at 794-95. Evans himself had suggested earlier that day that $1000 of the
be given as a check and be reported. Id. at 794.
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 794.
Evans, 504 U.S. at 257.
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"'the acceptance by an elected official of a campaign contribution does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Hobbs
Act even though the donor has business pending before the
official,' " a public official does violate the Hobbs Act if he
" 'demands or accepts money in exchange for [a] specific
requested exercise of his or her official power ... regardless
of whether the payment is made in the form of a campaign
contribution.' "80 The agreement between Evans and Cormany
therefore had to concern a specific official act, but it did not
have to be explicit. The jury convicted Evans on both counts. 81
Evans argued on appeal that the jury instructions improperly eliminated the "inducement" requirement (a showing of
coercive activity by the official) and thereby allowed the jury
to convict without even finding that Evans had conditioned the
performance of some official act upon payment of the money. 82
The Eleventh Circuit held that the power of the official's
public office always satisfies any "inducement" requirement;
therefore, once the government shows "that a public official
has accepted money in return for a requested exercise of
official power, no additional inducement need be shown."83
Accordingly, "passive acceptance of a benefit by a public official is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation if
the official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange for a specific requested exercise of his official power. "84
Although the Eleventh Circuit's opinion was written before
the Supreme Court decided McCormick, and therefore did not
directly address the quid pro quo requirement, its rejection of
an "inducement" requirement nonetheless affected the breadth
of the quid pro quo requirement. The Eleventh Circuit's holding that an official violates the Hobbs Act by passively accepting a campaign contribution known to be in return for a
specific official act requested by the payor85 obviated the need
for any words or actions on the part of the official, explicit or
implicit. Although the holding could be interpreted as only

80. Evans, 910 F.2d at 796.
81. Id. at 792.
82. Id. at 796. At the time of Evans' appeal, only the Second and Ninth Circuits
required an act of inducement by a public official in official extortion cases. Id. at 796
n.3 (citing United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), and
United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984)).
83. Id. at 796-97.
84. Id. at 796.
85. Id. ("The official need not take any specific action to induce the offering of
the benefit.").

·
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refusing to require that the official be the party to make the
agreement explicit, nothing in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion
suggests any sort of explicitness requirement.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that no
"inducement" requirement exists under the Hobbs Act. 86 The
Court further rejected Evans' argument that, because the jury
instructions allowed a conviction for passively accepting a
campaign contribution, the instructions failed to adequately
describe the quid pro quo requirement:
[Not instructing the jury to find an element of duress such
as a demand] satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of
McCormick v. United States . . . because the offense is
completed at the time when the public official receives a
payment in return for his agreement to perform specific
official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense. We also reject petitioner's contention
that an affirmative step is an element of the offense ....
We hold today that the Government need only show that
a public official has obtained a payment to which he was
not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in
return for official acts. 87
Taken literally, the last sentence suggests that an official can
violate the Hobbs Act simply by accepting a payment that he
knows is motivated by the payor's desire for the official to take
certain action on the payor's behalf, even though the official
never actually agreed or intended to perform the requested
act. 88 Moreover, the discussion of the quid pro quo requirement
in Evans never states that the apparent agreement between
the payor and the official must be explicit. Rather, the opinion
asserts that the facts of the case, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, demonstrate that Evans'

86. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268-69. The Court examined the history of official
extortion at common law and the legislative history of the Hobbs Act to reach its
conclusion. Id. at 259-67.
87. Id. at 268. For language in Justice Stevens' dissent in McCormick that
closely tracks this language in the Evans majority decision, see supra note 68.
88. See Lindgren, supra note 57, at 1735 (arguing that the majority's language
"doesn't require any actual agreement or intent to take any official act; what's
required is the receipt of a payment knowing it was made in return for official acts");
see also supra note 68, for the argument by Justice Stevens in McCormick that an
official does not have to perform any official act once he has accepted payments which
he knows were made for official acts.
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"acceptance of the bribe constituted an implicit promise to use
his official position to serve the interests of the bribegiver."89
Justice Kennedy concurred, but he argued that, while the
Hobbs Act does require "inducement," it does not require initiation by the official. 90 Rather, "inducement" simply requires the
existence of a quid pro quo. 91 Justice Kennedy explained that
the quid pro quo requirement essentially involves a finding of
criminal intent92 and "a real understanding [created by the
official's course of conduct] that failure to make a payment will
result in the victimization of the prospective payor or the
withholding of more favorable treatment."93 The quid pro quo
does not have to be stated expressly by either the official or the
payor, however, "for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods."94 Finally, Justice Kennedy's
assertion that "(t]he requirement of a quid pro quo in a § 1951
prosecution such as the one before us, in which it is alleged
that money was given to the public official in the form of a
campaign contribution," implied that Evans was, like McCormick, a campaign contribution case. 95
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the majority
completely disregarded the common-law meaning of extortion.96 He concluded that the Hobbs Act merely prohibits an
official from accepting a payment under the pretense that it
actually is due to him because of his office. 97 Justice Thomas
also declared, without explanation, that the holding in Evans
extended McCormick's quid pro quo requirement to all Hobbs

89. Evans, 504 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). The Court did state in a footnote
that even though •inducement" was unnecessary to prove violation of the Hobbs Act,
several discussions between Evans and Cormany indicated efforts tO •clarify their
understanding with each other." Id. at 266 n.17. Whether the Court was intimating
that these conversations constituted evidence of an explicit agreement is unclear. The
Evans Court's failure to require or even discuss explicitness may have resulted
simply from an oversight or strategic mistake by Evans' counsel, who focused the
argument on whether Evans had to take steps to honor his agreement. Brief of
Petitioner, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (No. 90-6105), available in
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file [hereinafter Evans' Brief].
90. Evans, 504 U.S. at 273-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 272-73.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 274-75.
94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. at 277-78. Justice Kennedy also stated that •the rationale underlying the
Court's holding applies not only in campaign contribution cases, but in all § 1951
prosecutions." Id. at 278.
96. Id. at 278--80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 281-82.
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Act official extortion cases, implying that Evans, unlike
McCormick, was not a campaign contribution case. 98
The majority opinion in Evans never explicitly indicated
whether it considered the case to involve a claimed campaign
contribution, although the concurring and dissenting opinions
offered contradictory interpretations. 99 The majority, however,
did assert that the standard that it was announcing satisfied
the quid pro quo requirement of McCormick, 100 suggesting that
the scope of Evans at least overlapped with that of McCormick.
The facts in Evans arguably contain more compelling evidence compared to the facts in McCormick that the payments
at issue were actual campaign contributions; they at least
allow for a plausible argument that the payments, even if
made in return for official acts, also were intended to be
contributions. 101 Further, the jury instructions 102 and both
parties' briefs to the Supreme Court all assumed that the case
involved what was claimed to be campaign contributions. 103

II. THE LOWER COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
QUID PRO Quo REQUIREMENT
Although McCormick and Evans sought to provide guidance
on the exact breadth of the Hobbs Act, the two opinions have
raised new questions regarding the quid pro quo requirement.
This section examines the lower courts' approaches to determining how specific the quid pro quo must be, how explicit it

98. Id. at 286.
99. See id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 286 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 268.
101. Evans' conversations with Cormany frequently concerned Evans' need to fund
his campaign and the fact that Evans would use any payments from Cormany to
cover such expenses. Euans, 910 F.2d at 792-95. Additionally, Evans kept all the
money at his campaign office, reported some of the payments on his state campaignfinancing disclosure form, and testified at trial that he used the unreported sums to
repay his campaign debts. Id. at 794-95. In contrast, there was little evidence in
McCormick that the payments were campaign contributions. See supra note 69.
102. Euans, 910 F.2d at 795-96.
103. See Evans' Brief, supra note 89; Brief for the United States, Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (No. 90-6105), auailable in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs
file [hereinafter Government's Brief].
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must be, and whether it must involve an actual agreement
between an official and a donor. 104

A. The Need for a Specific Official Action
Case law demonstrates that courts uniformly emphasize the
need for specificity105 and usually interpret Evans as having
imposed a diluted quid pro quo requirement in non-campaign
contribution cases. 106 Although this interpretation might imply
that campaign contribution cases should retain the undiluted
quid pro quo requirement of McCormick, most courts nonetheless minimize or simply reject the need for explicitness in any
official extortion case. 107
1. General Acceptance of the Specificity Requirement-If
courts have interpreted the quid pro quo requirement consistently at all, it is by uniformly stressing that it entails an
understanding between a payor and an official concerning
specific official acts. For example, in United States v. Davis, 108
the Eleventh Circuit stated that "the quid pro quo inquiry is
whether the link between extorted property and official power
is sufficiently specific" 109 and asserted that the primary flaw
of the instructions in McCormick was that they implied that
campaign contributions accompanied by the mere expectation
of benefits were illegal under the Hobbs Act. 110 Likewise, in
United States v. Allen, 111 the Seventh Circuit stated that, after
McCormick, "[v]ague expectations of some future benefit
should not be sufficient to make a payment a bribe." 112 The
104. These three inquiries admittedly are interrelated, and because analysis of
one facet of the quid pro quo often implicates another or all other such facets,
attempting to neatly categorize these inquiries can result in artificial distinctions or
can be an exercise in futility. Such categorization is nonetheless necessary for a
coherent presentation of the material.
105. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
108. 967 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. at 520.
110. Id. at 522.
111. 10 F.3d 405 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 411. This language strongly resembles the following language from
United. States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982):
Where the accused is or was an elected official authorized under our system to
solicit contributions, however, a fine line may separate a request for support
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Allen court also declared that a jury instruction stating that
an official cannot be convicted for accepting a campaign contribution paid "to create good will or with the uague expectation
of help in the future" captured McCormick's central idea. 113
This "specificity" requirement, however, requires only a specific goal; the official does not have to specify the means

from the sale of a favor. As a sister court has observed, "No politician who
knows the identity and business interests of his campaign contributors is ever
completely devoid of knowledge as to the inspiration behind the donation."
Consequently, we do not seek to punish every elected official who solicits a
monetary contribution that represents the donor's vague expectation of future
benefits. We must, nevertheless, discover and penalize those who, under the
guise of requesting "donations, n demand money in return for some act of official
grace.
Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
113. Allen, 10 F.3d at 412; see also United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 552-53
(11th Cir. 1994) (holding that jury instructions had failed to convey the quid pro quo
requirement by stating that an official has violated the Hobbs Act by accepting a
benefit if he "knows he had been offered the payment in exchange for the exercise of
his official power, or that such payment is motivated by hope of influence"); United
States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding instructions stating
that the official must know that a payment is made in exchange for specific official
acts), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 929 (1994); United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 651 (6th
Cir.) (describing the rule in United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127 n.1 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 649 (1993), that "[w]hat the Hobbs Act proscribes is the
taking of money by a public official in exchange for specific promises to do or refrain
from doing specific things" as consistent with McCormick); United States v. Taylor,
993 F.2d 382, 384-85 (4th Cir.) (holding that two jury charges were erroneous under
Evans because they only required an official to know that payments were motivated
by the official's office), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 249 (1993); United States v. Carpenter,
961 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.) (holding that a jury charge stating that "the Government
need not prove that the defendant promised to do anything in particular in return for
the payment of money" was in error), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 332 (1992).
The court in United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993), held that only
the second of the following three jury instructions sufficiently described the quid pro
quo requirement:
First, if a defendant sought or solicited [payments) ... in connection with
[his] official duties or otherwise communicated that he expected to receive
money or benefits, he induced the payments for purposes of the statute; or
Second, if a defendant conferred or offered to confer some benefit, or refrained or offered to refrain from some official act, in exchange for the payment
of monies or benefits ... , then he induced the payment of monies; or
Third, ifthe defendant repeatedly accepted monies or benefits. : . , and ifthe
amount of money or the benefits accepted could reasonably have affected the
defendant's exercise of his duties, then you may find that the defendant induced
the payment of monies.
Id. at 413, 415 (emphasis added).
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he will use. 114 Further, an official act may be nothing more
than fair treatment by an official. 115
This uniformity among courts is not surprising. The Court
in Evans and in McCormick emphasized that payors must have
had specific expectations regarding what the official was going
to do in return. In McCormick, the Court based its decision to
except from Hobbs Act coverage payments made with only
vague hopes of benefit on a perceived need to accommodate the
practical realities of politics; a contrary ruling, the Court
reasoned, would criminalize routine campaign financing. 116 The
Court also implied that the making of contributions to influence officials serves not only to finance political campaigns, but
also to inform officials of constituent preferences. 117 Lower
courts have echoed these themes, 118 and commentators have
noted that the law of bribery in general should be tailored to
avoid thwarting the valuable functions served by campaign
contributions. 119

114. E.g., Coyne, 4 F.3d at 114 (holding that the Hobbs Act applies when an
official has an understanding that he is to exercise influence as opportunities arise);
cf. United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976) (concluding that the
quid pro quo under a state bribery statute includes the official's "agreement to act
favorably to the donor when necessary"); see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 826 (1985)
(arguing that most state bribery statutes prohibit gifts made in order to influence an
official "either with respect to a specific official action, or ... 'when necessary' n).
115. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Hobbs Act also applies to an official's promise to not
victimize potential payors).
116. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
117. Id. at 272; see supra text accompanying note 57.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1992), affd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 382 (4th
Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 249 (1993); United States v. Taylor, 966 F.2d 830,
835 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
249 (1993); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
943 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1068-74, 1083
(1985) (defending the free expression of speech through political contributions and
praising campaign contributions both as effective signals of public support and
providers of information to officials and to the public); Lowenstein, supra note 114,
at 836-37 (arguing that the law of bribery can be neither obeyed nor enforced if it
"condemns much of what a politician needs to do on a daily basisn and urging that
the law of bribery should encourage officials to pursue their self-interest in a manner
that allows them simultaneously to enact wise policies, encourage political participation, and preserve freedom of speech); Weissman, supra note 11, at 450-51 (stating
that federal courts adopted the quid pro quo requirement because they did not want
to limit campaign contributions, which express political viewpoints and provide the
funds necessary for a broad exchange of ideas).
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2. Relationship of the Specificity Requirement to the Federal
Bribery Statute-Case law interpreting the federal bribery
statute 120 provides strong support for a requirement under the
Hobbs Act that payments be made in return for specific official
acts. The federal bribery statute prohibits federal officials,
employees, and jurors from accepting bribes or gratuities. 121
The general difference between a "bribe" and a "gratuity" under
the federal bribery statute is that bribery involves a higher
level of criminal intent; an official accepting a bribe must be
acting "corruptly" and with the intent to be influenced, 122
whereas an official accepting a gratuity must be acting "otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty'' and accepting a payment "for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by the public official."123 What these vague distinctions mean in practice is that
bribery involves a quid pro quo, 124 whereas accepting a gratuity does not. 125 The gratuity provision also prohibits two
different kinds of payments: those made as an after-the-fact
"thank you" to an official and those made in anticipation of
some future official action. 126 Further, many circuits have held
that a gratuity only need be linked to the official position of the

It is doubtful, however, that the specter of Hobbs Act liability significantly deters
payments to officials, legal or illegal. See Dozier, 672 F.2d at 540 n.5 (dismissing fears
that prosecutions oflocal bribery might chill campaign contributions by observing that
"the last ten years of constant litigation in this area does not appear to have produced
such paralysis"); Lindgren, supra note 57, at 1710 (asserting an inability to remember
a single case in whi~h an official acted properly and had his conviction upheld on
appeal, and stating that the law has not chilled large contributions or influencepeddling).
120. 18 u.s.c. § 201 (1988).
121. Id. This statute applies only to federal employees, officials, and jurors, id.
§ 201(a), and, therefore, it cannot be used like the Hobbs Act to prosecute local or
state public officials.
122. PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at 298-99.
123. Id. at 299 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)); see also United States v. Hsieh Hui
Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir.) (noting that bribery requires a showing of
"corrupt intent," a higher level of intent than that present in the payment of a
gratuity), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating
that payments motivated by "vague possibilities" are not bribes and noting that a
bribery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) requires proof of a quid pro quo), cert.
denied sub nom. Simon v. United States, 499 U.S. 904 (1991).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 980 (1978); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978). See generally PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4,
at 300 (noting that courts require some "lesser connection between the payment and
an official act" in gratuity cases).
126. See United States v. Secord, 726 F. Supp. 845, 846-47 (D.D.C. 1989).
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recipient, rather than to a specific official act. 127 Gratuities in
these circuits, therefore, include payments made to public
officials merely "to keep [the public official] 'happy' "128 or to
"create a better working atmosphere" 129 with that official.
The long-standing requirement in federal bribery cases that
the government prove that the official accepted a payment in
return for the performance of specific official acts is closely
tracked by the quid pro quo requirement only recently imposed
in Hobbs Act official extortion cases. 130 Likewise, the established rule under the federal bribery statute that an official
merely is accepting a gratuity, rather than a bribe, when he
accepts a payment motivated by a payor's generalized hope of
benefit mirrors the recent rule that an official who accepts a
payment motivated by a payor's general hope of benefit has not
committed official extortion. 131
Thus, requiring the government in official extortion cases to
prove that the official accepted a payment in return for specific

127. The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits refuse to require gratuities to be for
specific acts. See, e.g., Niederberger, 580 F.2d at 68-69; United States v. Alessio, 528
F.2d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Barash,
412 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969); see also United States v.
Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (requiring proof that an official accepted
a gratuity knowing that it was compensation for an official act, but refusing to require
proof that she had "specific knowledge" that the compensation was for a "definite official act").
·
128. PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at 300 (quoting United States v.
Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978)).
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Standefer, 452 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D. Pa.
1978), affd, 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also Randy J. Curato et al., Note,
Government Fraud, Waste and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1082 (1983) (arguing that "goodwill gifts and
favors to government officials that are motivated by a donor's generalized hope of
benefit will not satisfy the requisite intent for bribery, but will probably be construed
to be an illegal gratuity"); Whitaker, supra note 5, at 1622, 1650 (suggesting that
gratuities include payments designed to generate goodwill and not necessarily for a
specific official act).
130. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; see also Whitaker, supra note
5, at 1633 (arguing that the Evans Court effectively prevented the Hobbs Act from
applying to the acceptance of gratuities).
Case law, however, apparently has neither mentioned this phenomenon nor invoked
the long-standing quid pro quo requirement under the federal bribery statute as a
reason to impose a similar quid quo pro requirement under the Hobbs Act. But cf.
United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to apply
the quid pro quo requirement under the Hobbs Act to a gratuity prosecution, but only
on the grounds that, even if a quid pro quo requirement did apply to the gratuities
statute, McCormick and Evans imposed a quid pro quo requirement only in cases
involving campaign contributions), aff'd, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994), and cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1312 (1995).
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official acts advances both practical and equitable concerns.
Such a requirement is practical because it provides judges and
litigators with a uniform rule to determine when activity
constitutes bribery under either the federal bribery statute or
the official extortion clause of the Hobbs Act. Such a requirement also advances fairness by preventing the conviction of an
individual for official extortion, an act punishable by up to
twenty years in prison, 132 if all she has done is accept what
would be considered a gratuity under the federal bribery
statute, an act punishable by up to only two years in prison. 133
3. Limits to the Specificity Requirement-The Hobbs Act
does not prohibit an official from providing payors of campaign
contributions with access to officials, no matter how identifiable or specific the provision of access may be. The Ninth
Circuit has cited McCormick for the proposition that, given the
realities of an elected official's schedule, an official who conditions access to himself according to a lobbyist's level of campaign contributions has not performed an "official act" under
the Hobbs Act. 134 This holding resembles a pre-McCormick
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988). Although the federal bribery statute still carries
a lesser punishment than the Hobbs Act by imposing a possible sentence of only 15
years, id. at § 201(b), the disparity between a possible sentence of 20 years and a
possible sentence of 15 years is much less stark than the disparity between a possible
sentence of 20 years and a possible sentence of two years.
See Whitaker, supra note 5, at 1622, 1628 (noting that "[t]he typical one- to twoyear penalty under gratuities statutes evidences the lesser degree of culpability in
accepting a gratuity as opposed to a bribe," and criticizing federal prosecutors and
courts for convicting officials for extortion under the Hobbs Act when those officials
had accepted only gratuities); cf. Curato et al., supra note 129, at 1083 (arguing that
courts have construed a "gratuity" as covering a broader spectrum of activities than
"bribery" at least partly because of the severity of the bribery penalty).
Of course, the concern that corrupt public officials may endure draconian punishments may not be a realistic one. As of 1980, one might see "a person convicted of
bribery . . . receive probation or a maximum of 1 to 3 years in prison." GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSTICE NEEDS TO BETTER MANAGE ITS FIGHT AGAINST PuBLIC

CORRUPTION 36 (1980).
134. United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 332 (1992). The Carpenter court explained that "[e]lected officials must ration their
time among those who seek access to them and they commonly consider campaign
contributions when deciding how to ration their time. This practice 'has long been
thought to be well within the law [and) in a very real sense is unavoidable.'" Id.
(quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991)).
The court went on to say, however, that the conditioning of access can provide
circumstantial proof of a Hobbs Act violation when an official conditions access under
circumstances in which the grant or denial of access serves as a "clear and unambiguous message" that the official is conditioning either his vote on specific legislation
or his intervention with colleagues upon a lobbyist's campaign contribution level. Carpenter, 961 F.2d at 827-28. The official then would be using the grant or denial of
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decision, United States v. Rabbitt, 135 in which the Eighth
Circuit overturned a Hobbs Act conviction because the payors,
who knew that all the official could and would do was introduce them to other influential persons and "gain [the payors]
a friendly ear," lacked any reasonable belief in the official's
authority to award certain contracts. 136 Therefore, even though
the giving of campaign contributions in return for a potentially
useful introduction to another official or for a few minutes of
an official's time appears to comply with the technical requirements of a quid pro quo, courts should refuse to prohibit such
activity. 137 Courts apparently protect the selling of access for
the same reasons that a quid pro quo was imposed under the
Hobbs Act: to do otherwise would outlaw the day-to-day
operations of politics, an unacceptable result. 138

access as a subtle way of communicating his willingness to sell his vote. See id. at 827.
Under this test, evidence of a quid pro quo existed in Carpenter because the defendant,
when meeting with lobbyists to discuss specific legislation, refused to discuss the
legislation and instead insisted on reviewing the lobbyist's level of contributions. Id.
at 828.
135. 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
136. Id. at 1028. The Eighth Circuit cited Rabbitt with approval in United States
v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993), in which the court held that although Rabbitt
precludes Hobbs Act liability for merely introducing payors to other officials, it does
not preclude such liability for intending to or actively influencing other officials on
behalf of payors. Id. at 796.
137. Professor Lindgren argues that although the following two situations both
involve an explicit quid pro quo, neither would be illegal because they do not involve
any intent that is sufficiently "corrupt" under the Hobbs Act:
(1) A legislator says to a trucking company owner, "If you make this large
contribution to my campaign, I promise you three things. First, I won't vote on
any trucking legislation without calling you first. Second, when you call me, I
will drop whatever official business I am doing to take your call personally.
Third, when you or your clients come to town, I will rearrange my schedule
whenever possible to entertain you in the legislative dining room. I can't promise
you how I'll vote, but you can buy what any large contributor buys: direct access
to me."
(2) A legislator says to a large contributor, "If you give me a large contribution,
I'll consult you on my choice of my next chief of staff. Understand me, he'll be
working for me, not you. But I promise you that I'll pick someone you can work
with."
Lindgren, supra note 57, at 1736. Lindgren comments that the contributors in his
example receive the benefit of access through explicit, reciprocal deals, and these deals
might offend a person with very high ethical standards, but they simply would not
violate the Hobbs Act because the Supreme Court would not consider them "corrupt."
Id. at 1737. See also Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 806 (noting that conduct fitting
the literal description of bribery is regarded as criminal only if it is "corrupt").
138. See supra notes 116-19, 134, and accompanying text. Whether courts would
protect the conditioning of access to officials upon receipt of payments that are not
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This reasoning ignores the plausible argument made by some
commentators that many large campaign contributors buy
impressive influence among officials under the guise of simply
seeking "access." 139 According to this view, an official's "time is
so limited that the decision to listen to one person's arguments
and information on an issue and not another's is itself an official
action." 140 Some payments in return for access therefore are in
reality bribes, albeit judicially sanctioned ones. 141

B. The Need for an Explicit Understanding
1. General Hostility Towards the Explicitness Requirement-The Supreme Court announced in McCormick that an
official only violates the Hobbs Act by accepting payments
claimed to be campaign contributions "if the payments are
made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an official act. In such
situations the official asserts that his official conduct will be
controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking." 142 Both
Justice Scalia's concurrence and Justice Stevens' dissent
campaign contributions is unclear. For example, in Loftus, 992 F.2d at 796-97, a noncampaign contribution case, the court ruled against the defendant because it determined that he was providing more than just access, thereby giving no indication as
to whether non-campaign contributions used to secure only official access can violate
the Hobbs Act.
·
Courts should not protect officials who provide access to themselves or other
officials in exchange for payments that are not campaign contributions. Courts that
have protected the conditioning of access have done so in order to avoid interfering
with normal political activities. See supra note 134. It is neither common nor accepted
among officials, however, to exchange access for personal payments. For example,
while a senator's habit of agreeing to meet with her most generous campaign contributors would not surprise most people, a judicial clerk's habit of introducing litigants
to the judge in return for $50 payments would surprise people. Cf. NOONAN, supra
note 12, at 698 (arguing that access payments that are small, open, and uniformly
imposed are morally legitimate "entrance fee[s)9 but that such payments that are
large, secret and variable are not because they cannot help but be understood to have
been made in return for official acts).
139. See, e.g., NOONAN, supra note 12, at 649-51, 688-90 (discussing the difficulties
of distinguishing between contributions and bribes, access and votes); Lowenstein,
supra note 114, at 826-28 (arguing that even if the monetary amounts of campaign
contributions do not alone influence officials-an assumption that Lowenstein greatly
doubts-the moments of access gained by making contributions surely do).
140. Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 828 (citation omitted).
141. See NOONAN, supra note 12, at 689 (suggesting that the distinctions have
become arbitrary).
142. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (emphasis added).
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characterized the holding in McCormick as requiring an
explicitly stated understanding. 143
The holding in Evans, however, undermined this apparently
straightforward rule. The Evans majority never mentioned
explicitness and instead enunciated a rule subjecting officials
to liability for passively accepting payments known to be made
for official acts. The Evans Court further asserted that the
facts of the case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, demonstrated that the defendant had made an
implicit promise to perform official acts. 144 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy emphasized in his concurrence that a quid pro quo
does not have to be explicit but can be implied from words and
actions. 145
Given this tension between McCormick and Evans, lower
courts have grappled with whether officials must engage in
explicit bribery to be convicted under the Hobbs Act, and, if
so, just how explicit an "explicit" bribe must be. Some courts
have found that the existence of an explicitness requirement
depends upon whether the payments at issue are campaign
contributions. For example, the Second Circuit has stated
that "we have held since Evans that the government does not
have to prove an explicit promise to perform a particular
act." 146 In an earlier case, however, the Second Circuit interpreted Evans as applying only to non-campaign contribution
cases. 147 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Evans as modifying the explicitness prong of the quid pro quo
requirement only in non-campaign contribution cases. 148 The
143. Id. at 276 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 67, 70 and accompanying text.
144. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992); see also supra notes 87-89
and accompanying text.
145. Euans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Lindgren, supra
note 57, at 1738 ("In Euans, the Court has moved away from an explicit quid pro quo
to a much less strict reciprocity requirement.").
146. United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 929 (1994). The facts of Coyne indicate that it was not a campaign contribution
case because the $30,000 received by the official and deposited into his own bank
account was at best a personal loan and at worst a personal payment. Id. at 106.
147. United States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993) (construing Euans
as having modified McCormick's quid pro quo requirement in non-campaign contribution cases).
148. United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 552-53 (11th Cir. 1994). The Martinez
court overturned the appellant's convictions because the jury instructions allowed his
convictions to rest upon payments motivated only by the hope ofinfluence. Id. at 553.
Thus, although the Martinez court stated that an explicit promise was required in
campaign contribution cases, the court never actually had to decide whether a conviction premised upon a nonexplicit promise had to be overturned.
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Sixth 149 and Seventh 15° Circuits have stated that McCormick
requires explicitness, but they have done so only in campaign
contribution cases and have not mentioned Evans.
Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, however, appear
ambivalent about imposing a rigorous explicitness requirement
even in campaign contribution cases. One Sixth Circuit case,
United States v. Farley, 151 suggests that McCormick's quid pro
quo requirement might not entail true explicitness in practice.
Although the Farley opinion dutifully quotes language from
McCormick stating that a quid pro quo refers to campaign
contributions "made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking,"152 it nonetheless upholds a conviction on the basis that
the payor simply "understood" that his $500 donation to a
sheriff's department was a requirement for receiving an
"honorary" deputy sheriff commission which would shield the
payor's business from unwanted police attention. 153 The

Two years earlier, in United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1992), the
Eleventh Circuit had implied that the quid pro quo requirement was confined to
campaign contribution cases by stating that the McCormick opinion was "not deciding
a rule applicable to payments that were not campaign contributions" and by upholding
contested jury instructions that had stated that a quid pro quo was not always
necessary. Id. at 521.
149. See United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 649 (1993).
150. See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993).
When considering whether McCormick should inform an interpretation oflndiana's
bribery statute, the Allen court noted that McCormick held that "accepting a campaign
contribution does not equal taking a bribe unless the payment is made in exchange
for an explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act." Id. at 411. TheAllen
court stressed, however, that the central idea in McCormick was that a payment made
to create goodwill or with vague expectations of future help is not a bribe. Id. at 412.
151. 2 F.3d at 645.
152. Id. at 651 (emphasis omitted).
153. Id. at 653. The Farley court stressed that the following testimony by the payor
provided sufficient evidence to uphold an official extortion conviction:
Q:

A:

What did you do personally in order to obtain the Deputy Sheriff
commission or to apply for it?
Well, I approached [the officials' representative) and I asked him
about it ...

I filled out the paper and he took the paper, and, of course, there was
a $500 contribution orQ:
Continue please.
A:
-fee, you know, to--1 can't explain this. Donation more or less.
Q:
Did you get the commission?
A:
I'd say, yeah.
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Eleventh Circuit also has downplayed the need for explicitness
in campaign contribution cases, 154 despite having held that
Evans does not disturb McCormick's explicitness requirement
in campaign contribution cases. 155
The Fourth Circuit has suggested that official extortion exchanges never have to be explicit. In 1992, the court in United
States v. Taylor 156 found that jury instructions on inducement
did not sufficiently incorporate the quid pro quo requirement
of McCormick. 157 The government appealed this decision in
1993, post-Evans, but the Fourth Circuit held that the instructions were still in error. 158
The reasoning behind the Taylor decisions is instructive.
The defendant, a state representative, was convicted for
accepting cash payments in connection with pending legislation; the defendant maintained that the payments were all
campaign contributions. 159 The first decision approved of two
jury charges, one of which conditioned liability on "[p]roof of
a quid pro quo," the other on "[p]roof of a request, demand or
solicitation no matter how subtle. "160 Two other charges,
however, improperly conditioned liability on "[p]roof of custom
or expectation of receiving payment such as might have been
communicated by the nature of the public official's prior
conduct of his office" and "[r]eliance on a system of expecting
payment in exchange for public favors if the public official
establishes or acquiesces in the system and the person making
the payment is aware of the expectation." 161 The court explained that the last two instructions were improper because
they allowed the jury to convict for prior conduct, or for having

Id. The Farley court further highlighted the importance of the particular circumstances surrounding an exchange by noting that this payor testified that he wanted
the commission "because 'it seemed like the thing going around at the time.'" Id. at
650.
154. United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 516, 522 (11th Cir. 1992) (stressing that the
primary flaw in the instructions in McCormick was that they subjected campaign
contributions accompanied by the mere expectation of benefit to Hobbs Act liability).
The Davis court further downplayed a strict explicitness requirement by upholding
jury instructions that did not specifically mandate explicitness. Id.
155. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 553 (11th Cir. 1994).
156. 966 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir.), and cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 249 (1993).
157. Id. at 833.
158. United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 249
(1993).
159. 7bylor, 966 F.2d at 831.
160. Id. at 833 (quoting jury instructions).
161. Id. at 834 (quoting jury instructions).
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"acquiesced" to a corrupt system which the official neither
originated nor participated in. 162 The court, however, did not
criticize the instructions for failing to convey a need for explicitness. The instructions were erroneous because they allowed
the jury to convict even though the defendant had never
reached any understanding with the payor, not because they
allowed conviction for an implicit understanding. The first
Taylor opinion also focused on the need for specificity, noting
that the jury could have convicted for a payment motivated
only by vague expectations of general benefits. 163
In the second appeal, the court likewise held that the last
two charges were error under Evans as well as under
McCormick, because they only required the official to know
that the payments were motivated by his office rather than by
any particular official action. 164 Both Taylor decisions dispensed with any explicitness requirement by approving the
charge that the government could prove Hobbs Act bribery
through "[p]roof of a request, demand or solicitation no matter
how subtle" 165 and by apparently ignoring the defendant's
claim that the payments had been campaign contributions. 166
The Ninth Circuit has provided the clearest interpretation
of McCormick's explicitness requirement, eschewing an overly
rigorous conception of what constitutes an "explicit" arrangement even in campaign contribution cases. In United States v.
Carpenter, 167 the defendant argued that "the explicitness
requirement cannot be met unless an official has specifically
stated that he will exchange official action for a contribu-

162. Id. at 834-35.
163. Id. at 835. The Fourth Circuit criticized:
The portion of the charge, "So long as the defendant knows that the money
sought would be paid because of the public office involved, there need be no
promise with respect to official action in return for the payment," would allow
a Hobbs Act prosecution for almost all campaign contributions to incumbent
office-holders.
Id. (citation omitted).
164. Taylor, 993 F.2d at 385. This second Taylor decision hinted that the Evans
standard might apply to campaign contribution cases, stating that "Evans niakes
clear that the Hobbs Act applies to any payment to a public official to which the
official is not entitled and which payment the government official knows is made in
return for his official acts." Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
165. Taylor, 966 F.2d at 833 (quoting jury instructions) (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 831.
167. 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 332 (1992).
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tion." 168 The Carpenter court rejected that claim in a response
which anticipated Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Evans: "To read McCormick as imposing such a requirement
would allow officials to escape liability under the Hobbs Act
with winks and nods, even when the evidence as a whole
proves that there has been a meeting of the minds to exchange
official action for money." 169 The court then explained that the
explicitness requirement is intended merely to further indirectly the primary goal of the quid pro quo requirement-the
prevention of convictions based upon payments made with
only vague expectations ofbenefit. 170 The court arrived at the
following conclusion:
In our view, what McCormick requires is that the quid
pro quo be clear and unambiguous, leaving no uncertainty·
about the terms of the bargain. . . . [T)he explicitness
requirement serves to distinguish between contributions
that are given or received with the "anticipation" of official
action and contributions that are given or received in
exchange for a "promise" of official action. . . . When a
contributor and an official clearly understand the terms of
a bargain to exchange official action for money, they have
moved beyond "anticipation" and into an arrangement that
the Hobbs Act forbids. This understanding need not be
verbally explicit. 171
According to this interpretation, to require an "explicit"
arrangement is to require only sufficiently reliable proof,
direct or circumstantial, that an arrangement involving particular official acts exists. Although the Ninth Circuit has yet
to consider Evans, it is unlikely that Evans would affect its
analysis of explicitness. First, the court's analysis in Carpenter
largely tracks Justice Kennedy's analysis in Evans. Second,
even if the Ninth Circuit regards Evans as a non-campaign
contribution case, the circuit already has suggested that the

168. Id. at 827.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit in other opinions stated, without
elaboration, that McCormick requires proof that the official made an explicit promise.
See United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 598 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1661, and cert. denied sub nom. Netters v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2177 (1994);
United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1991).
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quid pro quo requirement remains the same whether or not
campaign contributions are involved. 172
2. Reasons to Reject the Explicitness Requirement-Decisions such as Carpenter properly regard the quid pro quo
requirement as not requiring true explicitness. First, a proper
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent indicates that
Evans is best understood as a campaign contribution case. 173
So understood, Evans replaces McCormick's "explicit promise"
standard in campaign contribution cases with a new standard
requiring proof "that a public official has obtained a payment
to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was
made in return for official acts." 174
Second, even if Evans is understood to have announced a
quid pro quo standard only for non-campaign contribution
cases, imposing an explicitness requirement would protect
those corrupt officials who are careful or lucky enough to avoid
explicit bribery, even when a jury has or could have found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that they accepted payments
known to be made in return for specific official acts. 175 Insisting on explicitness ignores the importance of circumstantial
evidence 176 and allows corrupt public officials to frustrate the
purpose of the Hobbs Act "by knowing winks and nods." 177 As
172. See Montoya, 945 F.2d at 1074 n.2 ("[W]e see no rational distinction between
cash payments claimed by the official to be lawful campaign contributions or those
alleged to be legitimate honoraria. The critical question is whether ... a quid pro quo
exists, not how an official labels the payments ....").
173. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
174. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
175. Professor Lindgren has criticized McCormick, inquiring "[i]f you can prove
a quid pro quo beyond a reasonable doubt, why should you also have to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the quid pro quo is explicit?" Lindgren, supra note 57, at
1733. He argues that requiring explicitness is both superfluous and harmful: "[T]he
incentives already lead crooks to make their deals less explicit, since enforcement in
court is never desired." Id. Furthermore, "[i]f one must test extortion by whether it's
corrupt in any event, a reciprocity requirement only adds another layer that may
exculpate those otherwise guilty of wrongful extortion." Id. at 1737; see also Evans,
504 U.S. at 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The criminal law ... concerns
itself with motives and consequences, not formalities. And the trier of fact is quite
capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or actions taken as well
as the reasonable construction given to them by the official and the payor. ").
176. Contextual evidence can be crucial in contradicting an official's claims of
innocence. Evidence of the following can reveal an official's guilt in the absence of
direct evidence: a temporal relationship between payments and official acts; the
nonperformance of, or disproportionate compensation for, service by the official; an
extraordinary undertaking by the official; or a mischaracterization or concealment
of a payment. PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at 234.
177. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. AMITAI ETZIONI, CAPITAL
CORRUPTION 58 (1984) (criticizing the law of bribery in general because it does not
deter sufficiently the making of unexplicit bribes).
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Justice Stevens has stated, "[s)ubtle extortion is just as wrongful-and probably much more common-than the kind of
express understanding that [McCormick] seems to require." 178
Third, case law interpreting the federal bribery statute 179
provides another reason not to require explicitness for official
extortion exchanges under the Hobbs Act. The comparable quid
pro quo requirement under the federal bribery statute does not
demand explicitness. 180 Tailoring the Hobbs Act quid pro quo
requirement to parallel the quid pro quo requirement under the
federal bribery statute promotes ease of decision making by
establishing a single standard for when conduct constitutes
bribery under either the Hobbs Act or the federal bribery
statute. It also promotes substantive fairness by treating equally defendants who have committed the same crime but are
prosecuted under different federal statutes. Just as the requirement that bribes prosecuted under the Hobbs Act must involve
specific official actions appropriately harmonizes the Hobbs Act
with the federal bribery statute, 181 the Hobbs Act should con-

178. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 282 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Professor Lowenstein argues that, even though requiring bribes to be expressly
arranged has an admitted evidentiary advantage,
[c)orrupt arrangements in the most conventional sense and in the most conventional settings often are carried out without express quid pro quo agreements .... To read a quid pro quo element into the majority of bribery statutes
that do not contain such a requirement would be to reward deviousness and
hypocrisy. Even if it would simplify the law of bribery, it would do so in an
entirely arbitrary manner.
Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 825-26 (citations omitted). But see Weissman, supra
note 11, at 460-62 (supporting the explicitness requirement in campaign contribution
cases).
179. 18 u.s.c. § 201 (1988).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 684 (2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that the quid pro quo element under the federal bribery statute can be established
through circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991). But see United
States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating without elaboration that
bribery under the federal bribery statute involves an explicit quid pro quo). The
statement in Brewster that the quid pro quo in bribery prosecutions must be explicit
is of questionable significance, however, given the court's later holding in United
States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
In Anderson, a case involving the appeal of the lobbyist convicted ofbribing the defendant in Brewster, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction for bribery based upon the circumstances of the dealings between the
defendant and Brewster. Id. at 331.
181. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
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tinue to mirror the federal bribery statute by not requiring that
officials arrange their bribes explicitly.
Individuals hostile to the use of the Hobbs Act to combat
local corruption may respond that the federal interest in
prosecuting local corruption is not as strong as the federal
interest in prosecuting corruption within the federal system.
Requiring a quid pro quo to be explicit under the Hobbs Act
therefore would be acceptable or even desirable because such
a requirement would reduce federal intervention in local
affairs. This objection does not explain, however, why federal
officials should be treated differently under the Hobbs Act and
the federal bribery statute. Further, there is no reason to
believe that only explicit instances of local bribery should be
liable under the Hobbs Act, because local bribery is so much
more difficult to identify than bribery by federal officials.
Moreover, given the unavoidable fact that the Hobbs Act does
apply to state and local officials, allowing a state governor who
avoids explicit bribery to elude federal criminal liability, while
simultaneously subjecting a forest service worker who accepts
tacit bribes to federal criminal liability, defeats the fair and
uniform application of punishment.

C. The Need for an Actual Agreement
The quid pro quo requirement mandates the objective appearance of an agreement, 182 but it does not mandate the existence of an actual bilateral agreement between an official
and a payor. The most obvious indication that a bilateral
agreement is not required is the fact that the payors in many
cases which reach trial are actually undercover government
agents. Aside from a possible desire to accumulate more
evidence, government agents presumably will have had no
subjective desire to see an official misuse her position in
return. for the payments. 183 Conversely, although the official

182. An "objective" appearance of an agreement must exist to the extent that the
jury can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the official intended the payor to
believe that a payment was likely ·to buy official action, see infra note 184 and
accompanying text, even though the jury also may determine that only one or neither
party actually intended for the apparent agreement to be honored.
183. See Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 820-21 (arguing that "[n)o court requires
an actual, bilateral agreement for a bribe" and that a mistaken agreement, such as
when one party is acting on behalf of law enforcement, can constitute a bribe).
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must have intended the payor to believe that she was likely to
perform an official act in exchange for a payment, 184 the
official can be guilty of Hobbs Act extortion even if she never
intended actually to perform the act 185 or if she always intended to perform the act irrespective of receiving a payment. 186
Furthermore, an official's attempts to shield herself from
criminal liability by refusing to guarantee results should fail,
as long as the official intended the payor to believe that a payment likely would secure the official's efforts to attain a possibly unattainable goal.

III. THE FUTURE OF THE QUID PRO Quo REQUIREMENT
A. The Evans Standard Should Replace
the McCormick Standard
McCormick announced an apparently clear definition of a
quid pro quo requirement in campaign contribution cases:
"[T]he payments are made in return for an explicit promise or
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an
official act." 187 Evans, however, without noting whether it was
deciding a campaign contribution case, announced a different

184. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (finding that prosecutors "need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was
not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts"); see also
id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Al public official violates§ 1951 ifhe intends
the payor to believe that absent payment the official is likely to abuse his office and
his trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective payor.").
Likewise, the dissent in McCormick argued that an official violates the Hobbs Act
by accepting a payment "pursuant to an understanding that he would not carry out
his earlier threat to withhold official action and instead would go forward with his
contingent promise to take favorable action." McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S.
257, 283 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. See Lindgren, supra note 57, at 1735 (noting that Evans "doesn't require any
actual agreement or intent to take any official act [sic]"); see also Evans, 504 U.S. at
268 (stating that, "the offense is completed at the time when the public official
receives a payment ... fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the
offense").
186. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[E]vidence that [an
official] would have supported the legislation anyway is not a defense to the already
completed crime."). But cf Whitaker, supra note 5, at 1651-52 & n.195 (arguing that
a model federal public corruption statute should require proof that an official act
would not have occurred without a payment, but citing United States v. Arroyo, 581
F.2d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1978), for the proposition that such proof should be
unnecessary ifthe official led the payor to believe that the performance of the official
act depended upon the making of a payment).
187. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. at 273.
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standard: A public official violates the Hobbs Act when he
"receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform
specific official acts." 188
Whether the contours of the quid pro quo requirement can
or should vary according to whether the payments are claimed
to be campaign contributions depends upon how one interprets
Evans. As this Note has discussed, courts uniformly have
interpreted both McCormick and Evans to require proof that
the official intended the payor to believe that the official likely
would perform or not perform specific official acts in return for
a payment. 189 Evans and McCormick differ, however, as to
whether the official and the payor explicitly must agree to
trade money for action or whether the official merely must
know that a payment is being made in return for specific
official acts. 190 If Evans is understood to be a campaign contribution case, it may have diluted the quid pro quo requirement
described in McCormick by rejecting an explicitness requirement in such cases. In non-campaign contribution cases, courts
would remain free to reject the specificity, apparent agreement,
or explicitness requirements. If Evans is understood to be a
non-campaign contribution case, however, then it may have left
the holding of McCormick intact in campaign contribution cases
and merely extended a diluted quid pro quo requirement-one
not demanding explicitness-to non-campaign contribution
cases. Alternatively, Evans niay have replaced the McCormick
standard entirely and extended a diluted quid pro quo requirement to all official extortion cases.
Evans is best interpreted as a campaign contribution case.
First, the concurrence by Justice Kennedy implied that it was
such a case. 191 Second, the facts in Evans contain more compelling evidence that the payments at issue were actual campaign
contributions than do the facts in McCormick, 192 a case explicitly
analyzed as a campaign contribution case. 193 Third, the jury
instructions and both parties' briefs before the Supreme Court

188. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.
189. See supra notes 108-19, 182-86 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 142-45, 155 and accompanying text.
191. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 272-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra note
95 and accompanying text.
192. See United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 792-95 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing
conversations between Evans and an undercover FBI agent); see also supra notes 69,
101 and accompanying text.
193. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 271.
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assumed that Evans involved putative campaign contributions. 194 The Evans standard, therefore, should be interpreted
to have replaced the McCormick standard and to have removed
the explicitness requirement in campaign contribution cases. 195
Policy reasons also support such an interpretation. The
easily-met definition of a campaign contribution for Hobbs Act
purposes allows defendants to claim that money, although never
documented nor spent as campaign funds, was actually a
campaign contribution. 196 Requiring explicitness in campaign
contribution cases would result in defendants claiming as a
matter of course that payments were campaign contributions.
Moreover, the Evans standard should be applied uniformly, and
explicitness should never be required, in order to harmonize
the Hobbs Act with the federal bribery statute, which neither
requires explicit bribes 197 nor makes distinctions according to
whether a defendant has claimed that the payments at issue
are campaign contributions. 198
Judicial application of the McCormick and Evans decisions
supports this analysis. Although the Second and Eleventh
Circuits have interpreted Evans as a non-campaign contribution case that imposed a diluted quid pro quo requirement
that did not affect the holding of McCormick in campaign
contribution cases, 199 the Fourth Circuit has implied that
Evans announced a new standard for all official extortion

194. See Evans, 910 F.2d at 795-96; Evans' Brief, supra note 89; Government's
Brief, supra note 103; see also Whitaker, supra note 5, at 1651 & n.194 (analyzing
Evans as a campaign contribution case).
195. Special judicial deference to officials' needs to fund their political campaigns
has resulted in the imposition of the explicitness requirement. See supra notes 116-19
and accompanying text. Since any special deference would be unwarranted when payments are not claimed to be political contributions, explicitness logically should not
be requi,red in non-campaign contribution cases.
196. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 260 (describing unreported cash payments in
violation of state law as campaign contributions); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d
516, 518, 521 (11th Cir. 1992) (reviewing as a campaign contribution a payment made
to an official who gave a lobbyist a piece of paper with the figure $25,000 on it while
stating that she could get a desired bill out of committee for that amount).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988); see also supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
198. See PuBLIC CORRUPI'ION CASES, supra note 4, at 302-03 (stating that a bribery
or gratuity charge under the federal bribery statute can be premised upon a campaign
contribution and noting no other special requirements in campaign contribution cases
other than the need to "distinguish between a lawful campaign contribution ... and
an unlawful bribe or gratuity").
199. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 552-53 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Garcia, 992 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 146-48 and
accompanying text.
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cases, 200 and one district court explicitly has held that Evans
is a campaign contribution case. 201 Further, courts have weakened the explicitness requirement when applying McCormick, 202 in effect applying the Evans standard in all official
extortion cases.
The Evans requirement of an apparent agreement regarding
specific official acts also should apply to cases where defen-:
dants do not claim that the payments were campaign contributions. As Justice Kennedy stressed in his concurrence in Evans,
the most important requirement in any official extortion
prosecution is that the defendant harbored the requisite
criminal intent. 203 The degree of requisite culpability that the
prosecution must prove should not depend upon how the
defendant labels a payment. Giving a thing of value, regardless of whether it is a gift, an honorarium, a salary, a loan, a
consulting fee, or a campaign contribution, should never
violate the Hobbs Act, unless the gift is in return for specific
official acts. 204 Limiting the Evans requirement of an apparent
agreement regarding specific official acts to campaign contribution cases would subject officials to liability under the
Hobbs Act merely for accepting non-campaign contribution
payments that would be considered only gratuities under the
federal bribery statute. 205
One might argue that the Hobbs Act should require an
apparent agreement regarding specific official acts only in
campaign contribution cases because other things of value
exert a stronger influence on officials. 206 Although such a dis-

200. United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382, 384 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra note
164.
201. United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1171 & n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1993),
affd, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1994).
202. See supra notes 151-72 and accompanying text.
203. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 272-78 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the quid pro quo requirement in Euans is proper both as a matter
of statutory construction and because criminal laws traditionally require intent).
204. See id. at 278. ("Readers of [Euans) should have little difficulty in understanding that the rationale underlying the Court's holding applies not only in
campaign contribution cases, but all§ 1951 prosecutions. That is as it should be, for,
given a corrupt motive, the quid pro quo ... is the essence of the offense.").
205. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
206. See Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 847. Professor Lowenstein argues:
Contributions intended to influence official conduct and accepted with the
knowledge that they are so intended therefore may be regarded as corrupt. The
political pressure that they generate appeals solely to the official's self-interest.
This pressure is not a by-product of legitimate activity engaged in for reasons
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tinction between campaign contributions and other things of
value may be a plausible theoretical proposition, qualitatively
distinguishing between different forms of payments for the
purposes of the Hobbs Act would be arbitrary and impractical.
Implementing a blanket rule limiting the requirements of
Evans to campaign contribution cases would be arbitrary
because, for example, it would subject a $50 gift given with
only a general expectation of benefit to Hobbs Act liability, but
would except a $20,000 campaign contribution given with the
exact same expectations. Even assuming that the official
actually spends the $20,000 contribution on his campaign,
such a large contribution presumably would exert more influence than the $50 gift. Likewise, distinguishing between
campaign contributions and other things of value would be
useless in practice if defendants learn routinely to characterize
payments as campaign contributions for the purpose of securing a higher criminal intent requirement. 207
Evans therefore should be acknowledged as a campaign
contribution case that provides a uniform rule for all official
extortion cases: An official must intend a payor to believe that
he likely will perform or not perform specific official acts in
return for a payment, and the official must accept a payment
knowing that it was made in return for specific official acts.
Accordingly, prosecutors always should be required to prove
the existence of an apparent agreement concerning the performance of particular official acts, regardless of whether the
defendant claims that the payments were campaign contributions. Prosecutors, however, never should be required to prove
that an understanding between an official and a payor was
explicit or that an actual agreement existed.

other than influencing official decisions. On the other hand, contributions
intended solely to help the candidate get elected also might generate political
pressure, but this pressure, like that generated by endorsements, is a byproduct of the contributor pursuing his goals in a manner accepted within the
system.
Id. (citation omitted). Professor Lowenstein then considers a "contribution made for
the dual purpose of influencing official action and improving the official's electoral
prospects," and concludes that such payments are still unacceptably harmful and
properly regarded as corrupt. Id. at 847 n.235.
207. Courts have, for the purpose of invoking the requirements of McCormick,
treated indulgently a defendant's claim that particular payments were campaign
contributions. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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B. The Practical Effect of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
Case law demonstrates that a quid pro quo requirement is
usually an obstacle for prosecutors only with regard to legal,
rather than factual, issues, because defendants usually are
explicit and specific in their dealings. Defendants succeed on
appeal only by contesting the jury instructions, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Prosecutors, therefore, should not risk
quibbling over the semantics of jury instructions.
One case in particular, United States v. Garcia, 208 shows how
insufficient jury instructions can result in a retrial, even when
the evidence of a defendant's guilt is very strong. In Garcia,
Congressman Robert Garcia, his wife, Jane Lee Garcia, and
their associate, Ralph Vallone, all successfully appealed their
official extortion convictions in a case arising out of Congressman Garcia's involvement with the Wedtech Corporation. In
1984, a Wedtech officer told Garcia over dinner about
Wedtech's current contract with the Navy and its desire to
obtain another contract to produce mail containers. Garcia
responded by describing his increasing influence in Congress
and suggesting that Wedtech hire his wife as a consultant. 209
Garcia's wife told the Wedtech officer that they "could do a lot
of things" for Wedtech, including setting up appointments to
see the Secretary of the Navy and the Postmaster General to
discuss possible contracts. 210 She also explained that they had
a friend, a lawyer in Puerto Rico (Vallone), who could act as
an intermediary for the payments. 211
Wedtech eventually agreed and ultimately paid $86,000 to
Vallone through monthly "retainers" of $4100 each. Vallone in
turn paid $76,000 in alleged "consulting fees" to Mrs. Garcia. 212
At trial, the Wedtech officer testified that" 'we knew that if
those payments were not made . . . we could kiss the ...
potential contracts, good-bye.' "213 Over the course of the relationship, Garcia contacted the Postmaster General about
contracting with Wedtech and interceded on Wedtech's behalf

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

992 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1993).

Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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with three banks and a congressional investigation. 214 At
Garcia's request, Wedtech donated $65,000 to Garcia's sister's
church and gave Mrs. Garcia a diamond and emerald necklace
after the Garcias had arranged for Wedtech to meet with the
governor of Puerto Rico and receive additional building contracts. 215 Garcia also requested a $20,000 loan from Wedtech
for his sister, and although he eventually repaid the loan, he
did so without paying interest and only after unsuccessfully
asking Wedtech to donate the money to his sister's church. 216
The government's meticulous efforts to compile all of this
evidence, however, did not prevent the Second Circuit from
reversing the convictions and remanding for a new trial on the
grounds that the trial court had not required the jury to find,
under Evans, that the defendants had accepted payments
knowing that they were in return for specific official acts. 217
The Garcia court noted that its decision was based on a legal,
as opposed to an evidentiary, deficiency. 218
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in United States
u. Carpenter, 219 reversing a conviction because the instruction
was inadequate under McCormick while acknowledging that
sufficient evidence existed of two separate quid pro quo exchanges. 220 The first exchange occurred when the defendant's
aide told a government agent that the defendant was "the best
person to 'front' the legislation" and that his services would
cost $20,000; the second exchange occurred when the defendant, after having been told of that conversation, informed his
aide that he "would assist the bill through the Senate" and told
an undercover agent that "things were going smoothly" because
the defendant had the "right friends" in the State Senate. 221
Other courts also have reversed official extortion convictions
on the basis of inadequate jury instructions, despite the
existence of strong evidence of guilt. 222
214. Id.
215. Id. at 411-12.
216. Id. at 412.
217. Id. at 414-16.
218. Id. at 416.
219. 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 332 (1992).
220. Id. at 828-29.
221. Id. at 826-28.
222. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), is the most prominent
example of an opinion reversing a conviction due to improper jury instructions,
irrespective of strong evidence of guilt. The majority in McCormick indicated that it
was not ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 267-68 n.5, 274. The dissent
believed "that the evidence presented to the jury was adequate to prove [guilt] beyond
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A survey of the facts of the official extortion cases published
after McCormick and Evans indicates that officials tend to
implicate themselves in rather clear and explicit ways. In
United States v. Davis, 223 the Eleventh Circuit upheld, under
McCormick, the conviction of a state representative who had
invited a lobbyist into her office, given him a piece of paper
with the figure $25,000 written on it, and stated that she could
get desired legislation out of committee for that amount. 224 In
United States v. Loftus, 225 the Eighth Circuit rejected an
official's claim that the evidence indicated only that he had
acted as a lobbyist. 226 The official had told an FBI informant
that he would work on a rezoning application for $25,000; told
the informant that he should not be hired as a lobbyist because
then the official would not be able to use his title; insisted on
using an intermediary because "[i]f they're handing me something directly then they've got me"; and suspended his efforts
on the rezoning application due to an expressed desire to avoid
being implicated in an ongoing bribery investigation. 227 Other
cases contain similarly strong evidence. 228
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Derrick, No. 92-5084, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1651, at *3-8 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1994)
(reversing conviction for lack of quid pro quo instructions complying with either
McCormick or Evans but refusing to find insufficient evidence where tapes showed
defendant stating to a lobbyist that he knew that the lobbyist needed him either to
vote for or fail to oppose a bill, which referred to a prior understanding that the
lobbyist.would pay the defendant for either action); United States v. Taylor, 966 F.2d
830, 831, 833-35 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that videotapes showed government informant
giving payments to defendant but reversing under McCormick for failure to instruct
on quid pro quo requirement), aff'd on reh'g, 993 F.2d 382 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 249 (1993).
223. 967 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1992).
224. Id. at 520-22.
225. 992 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993).
226. Id. at 797.
227. Id. at 794-97.
228. See supra notes 208-22; see also United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 588-89
(9th Cir. 1993) (legislative aide told FBI agent that another aide would revive desired
legislation in exchange for $5000, some of which replaced money that would be given
back to the agent in order to avoid the appearance of bribery), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1661, and cert. denied sub nom. Netters v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2177 (1994);
United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1993) (defendant accepted $30,000
from architects who had secured a lucrative county contract through the efforts of
defendant; defendant suggested that the payment be made to appear as a loan in order
to "legitimize" the action), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 929 (1994); United States v. Farley,
2 F.3d 645, 648-50 (6th Cir.) (county sheriffs and their representatives routinely
asked persons to pay $500 in cash in exchange for "honorary" deputy sheriff commissions), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 649 (1993); United States v. Fant, 776 F. Supp. 257,
261 (D.S.C. 1991) (defendant had a conversation with a lobbyist in which the lobbyist
promised "hits" or "pops" of "five hundred" for particular official acts).
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These cases suggest that an explicitness requirement would
not prove to be a significant obstacle to prosecutors in practice, 229 despite the vast array of tactics based on subtlety that
a corrupt public official can employ to defeat a charge of official
extortion. 230 The potential significance of an explicitness reAdmittedly, this survey of only published opinions may present an extremely
inaccurate picture of official extortion cases overall. Published opinions necessarily
involve only cases in which the government decided that it was worth the time and
money to investigate and go to trial, rather than forego either an investigation or a
prosecution due to a lack of evidence. Moreover, opinions by circuit courts necessarily
involve only convicted defendants, rather than those found to be completely innocent.
On the other hand, rarely would a court publish an opinion in a case in which the
defendant has pied guilty.
229. Several commentators have argued, however, that most bribes are performed
quite subtly. For example, Professor Lindgren has mocked the explicitness requirement of McCormick:
Justice White see:mS to think that corrupt officials act like the killers in movie
and television murder mysteries. In the last few minutes of most hack mysteries,
.the villain pauses before murdering the clever detective to explain to the
detective how and why he killed; this pause ... makes explicit to the audience
what happened. But in government corruption, only idiots or targets of government stings are likely to make things explicit. That's not how things are usually
done. As Noonan notes, "[d)ealing with intelligent donees, the donor may
reasonably expect a better return if he is not specific."
Justice White commits what I call the Lawyer's Fallacy, named by analogy
to the Psychologist's Fallacy and the Historian's Fallacy. The Lawyer's Fallacy
assumes that people understand what they do, while they do it, from the
perspective of a lawyer or that people act as if they are creating evidence for
lawyers to find later. It sees people cooperatively climbing into pigeonholes
where lawyers can easily find them.
Lindgren, supra note 57, at 1734 (footnotes omitted). Professor Lindgren describes
the practical difference between requiring explicitness and not requiring explicitness
as "stark." Id. at 1733.
The "Lawyer's Fallacy," however, is a double-edged sword. Public officials presumably do not act like spies, and, just as they do not conduct their everyday lives
for the benefit of prosecuting attorneys later preparing for trial, they do not conduct
their everyday lives for the benefit of defense attorneys later preparing for trial. The
case law demonstrates that even supposedly "sophisticated" criminals such as corrupt
public officials are not as clever and far-sighted as sometimes thought to be. Cf.
Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 848. Lowenstein notes that "under our present system
of campaign finance, politicians and interest groups engage routinely, not in 'legalized'
bribery, as is commonly supposed, but in felonious bribery that goes unprosecuted
primarily because the crime is so pervasive." Id.
230. Perhaps the best tactic that a corrupt official can adopt is to perform only
those favors commonly performed in his particular community, thereby relying on the
unspoken understandings of his environment to communicate his intentions. Although
an adept prosecutor could introduce evidence of the context in which an official
operated in order to demonstrate the true import of any potentially ambiguous words
or deeds, the official's reliance on values which many individuals in the community
embrace will increase the chances that citizens, from witnesses to jurors, will not cooperate with the government in securing a conviction. See PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES,

WINTER 1995)

Quid Pro Quo Requirement

453

quirement is undermined further by the fact that government
undercover agents purposefully can render an official's transactions conveniently explicit. 231
Even though the existence of an explicitness requirement
may have little practical effect, the Hobbs Act still should not
contain such a requirement. First, as an empirical matter,
whether bribes usually are arranged explicitly is at best controversial and at worst unknowable. Second, it is unlikely that
officials mistakenly will be convicted for accepting legitimate
payments in the absence of an explicitness requirement, because juries must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
an official accepted a payment knowing that it was in return
for a specific official act. Third, given the very necessity of
campaign contributions, it is extremely improbable that legitimate political contributions in general will be chilled merely
because the Hobbs Act does not require explicitness.

supra note 4, at 20 (stating that "government contract corruption" exists because of
"substantial ignorance" or, even worse, "outright acquiescence" by the community and
arguing that prosecutors must know what the community considers "real lawbreaking," because the "level of public morality ... will determine whether prosecution ~ill
succeed or not"); see also id. at 161-62 (noting that many witnesses will refuse to
cooperate with the government because they will resent the prosecutor for interfering
with business as usual).
A corrupt official can structure his transactions so that bribes appear to be payments for services, profits from business investments, or informal loans unrelated to
his public office. Id. at 233. Similarly, an official might' attempt to camouflage an
official act performed for a payor as merely "a customary constituent service or some
other government entitlement for which the citizen qualified," id., possibly by
frequently performing services identical to those sometimes conditioned upon payment
or by limiting the extent of the services performed for any one payor. An official also
might restrict his illicit favors to activities which plausibly could be construed as
providing access only, see supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text, or, as the
defendant in McCormick did, to performing favors consistent with his usual and wellknown stance on a given issue, see supra text accompanying notes 29-31. Use of an
intermediary may backfire, however, because that tactic may provide the government
with a potential witness and the opportunity to bring a conspiracy charge. See
Weissman, supra note 11, at 462 n.209 (noting that the use of intermediaries can
result in a conspiracy conviction).
231. For example, when cataloguing the evidence agf!,inst the petitioner, the
Government's briefbefore the Supreme Court in Euans asserted that the undercover
~gent "repeated the terms of the arrangement [between the defendant and himself]
explicitly, as he understood them." Government's Brief, supra note 103. In another
case, the defendant chided the undercover government agent for having been too
explicit with a legislative aide, warning the agent while being taped that "[s]ome
things are best never said." Freeman, 6 F.3d at 589.
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C. Judges' Philosophies Will Mold the
Quid Pro Quo Requirement
IBtimately, how strictly a judge will interpret the quid pro
quo requirement will depend partly upon her particular moral
and political viewpoints. 232 Professor Lowenstein has drawn a
parallel between three theories of political representation and
three theories of corruption. The first political theory, the
trusteeship theory, regards outside pressure as harmful to the
extent that it interferes with a legislator's ability to pursue
the objective public interest. This parallels a view of corruption as being that which is immoral. 233 The second political
theory, the mandate theory, regards outside pressure as
harmful to the extent that it interferes with a legislator's
willingness to enact popular preferences. This parallels a view
of corruption as being that which thwarts public opinion. 234
The third political theory, pluralism, stresses the importance
of a legislator's ability to register accurately the various forces
exerted by competing groups. This parallels a view of corruption as being that which is legally defined as such. 235
Professor Lowenstein's discussion is useful because it provides a backdrop for understanding how one's political and
moral philosophy can affect how rigorous one thinks laws
against political corruption should be. Individuals who
subscribe to either of the first two political theories, the
trusteeship or the mandate theories, presumably will be more
alarmed by the fact that wealthy individuals may purchase
disproportionate political influence-regardless of whether
they do so through exchanges involving quid pro quo arrangements-because disproportionate influence by the wealthy
tends to deter a legislator from exercising independent judgment or responding to popular preferences. Conversely,
pluralists will be less alarmed by the purchasing of political

232. Cf. MICHAEL JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
AMERICA 144 (1982) ("[D]ecisions about institutional reform are still decisions about
what kind of politics and policy we want, whether we realize it or not."); Lowenstein,
supra note 114, at 848 (asserting that deciding when a campaign contribution is in
fact a bribe is not a neutral political question).
233. See Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 833-34 & n.193.
234. See id. at 834-36 & n.193.
235. Id. at 837 & n.193.
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influence. As Professor Lowenstein explains, under the pluralism model of politics,
[t]he public official is seen as a purely passive agent, who
responds more or less perfectly to group pressures. Under
this conception, preoccupation with the integrity of representatives is beside the point, and there is little sense in a
concept like corruption, at least at the policy-making level.
Any practice that seriously interferes with the accuracy
with which officials register the strength of contending
forces is perhaps a source of concern, but the pluralist
conception of policy as the outcome of a mechanical process
provides no basis for assessing the accuracy of the registering of group forces. Accuracy is assumed. 236
What pluralism considers corrupt, therefore, is simply that
which traditionally has been prohibited, such as quid pro quo
exchanges with officials, rather than what newer, more expansive theories of public accountability may consider unacceptable. 237
Given the connection between money and political influence,
the imposition of a strict quid pro quo requirement in official
extortion cases partly reflects an acceptance of the fact that
people who are able to give money to officials to maintain
goodwill enjoy much greater political influence than those who
cannot give money. 238 Conversely, to impose Hobbs Act liability

236. Id. at 838 (citation omitted).
237. For two examples of commentators who reflect a pluralist perspective and
attack what they perceive to be overly-aggressive attempts at campaign finance
reform, see BeVier, supra note 119, and Miriam Cytryn, Comment, Defining the
Specter of Corruption: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 57 BROOK.
L. REV. 903 (1991). Professor BeVier criticizes "reformers who have tended to imply
that corruption is synonymous both with outright bribery on the one hand and with
the general possession or specific exercise of 'too much' political power on the other"
and asserts that judicial opinions, in refusing to equate corruption with undue
political power, have prohibited only quid pro quo exchanges. BeVier, supra note 119,
at 1081-82. Cytryn likewise criticizes the majority opinion in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), for "defin[ing) corruption to include
what it found was the unfair influence of corporate money on the outcome of an
election," rather than defining corruption as only "the trading of money by a constituent for political favors from a candidate." Cytryn, supra, at 904.
238. See generally ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW RoAD TO
CORRUPTION (1983) (discussing how the need to raise money has affected politics);
NOONAN, supra note 12, at 647-51 (discussing political action committees and how
their influence correlates to the amount of their campaign contributions). The fact
that judges have imposed a quid pro quo requirement in official extortion cases,
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when an official accepts payments made with general hopes of
benefit, to secure access, or pursuant to a shared, implicit
understanding, is to be less tolerant of the correlation between
wealth and political influence. 239 Although advocates of a strict
quid pro quo requirement could justify the requirement solely
according to a vision of what is practical in politics240 instead of
what is the moral ideal, a person's actual moral principles will
affect how much inequality in influence he is prepared to accept
in the name of practicality before he considers such inequality
to be corrupt. 241

CONCLUSION

Despite the recent imposition of a quid pro quo requirement,
the Hobbs Act remains one of the most potent weapons for
combating local and public corruption. Although courts have
prevented the Hobbs Act from transcending the traditional law
of bribery by limiting the statute's reach to payments made for
specific official acts, courts also either have rejected or ignored
any requirement that the parties engage in explicit bribery.
Courts instead focus on whether an official has manifested the
requisite criminal intent, and the prosecutor remains free to
prove such intent through any available evidence. Nevertheless,
a survey of the published case law reveals that corrupt officials

however, of course does not indicate a judicial acceptance of bribery. See NOONAN,
supra note 12, at 590 (arguing that judges' corporate ethic encouraged the general
expansion of federal prosecutions of local political corruption).
239. Noonan, after explaining that one argument raised by apologists for political
corruption is that foes of corruption are acting simply out of envy and spite, notes
that to oppose corruption is normally to oppose those in power. He later argues that
to condone official corruption is to pander to the wealthy. NOONAN, supra note 12, at
691-92, 699, 703-04; see also PuBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 4, at iii
(attacking political corruption as "almost always [working) to the detriment of the
most disadvantaged members of society"); Lowenstein, supra note 114, at 849
(arguing that the influencing of officials with money corruptly favors the wealthy and
skews political outcomes so as to reinforce previously-existing inequalities); see
generally Peter M. Manikas, Campaign Finance, Public Contracts and Equal
Protection, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 817, 819 (1983) (invoking equal protection concerns
as compelling reasons to regulate campaign contributions).
240. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
241. Cf. NOONAN, supra note 12, at 705 ("[O)ne's existing balance of values go[es)
into the perception of one's ends; at the same time the ends chosen affect the person
one becomes. The dynamism of movement to ends determines what one regards as
human needs and affects one's choice of the means necessary to satisfy them.").
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eventually implicate themselves through explicit statements, a
phenomenon that belies any assumptions that corrupt officials
are always carefully discreet when arranging and accepting
bribes.
Courts should continue to require in all Hobbs Act public
corruption prosecutions proof that the payments were made in
return for specific official acts; they also should continue to
reject an explicitness requirement. Whether a defendant claims
that payments were campaign contributions therefore should
not affect the quid pro quo requirement. Ultimately, the way in
which courts interpret the evolving quid pro quo requirement
will turn partly upon the individual political and moral beliefs
of judges.

